Friday, December 07, 2007

Geopolitics part 2

The so-called geopolitical state of nature cannot be seen as a state of constant warfare, in the Hobbesian sense. It is pretty obvious what war is like between nations, and war only occasionally describes the way things are. The geopolitical state of nature is probably better seen as an arena of power, in which each nation seeks a certain amount of that power for its own benefit. If the powers among or between states are in a mutually satisfactory equilibrium, this balance of power is construable as peace. If the powers are not in equilibrium, then we are either at war, or in danger of being at war. The question then is, what exactly comprises a mutually satisfactory equilibrium?

All countries do not share the same goals, and the goals of each are rooted in its culture. But one would be hard-pressed to claim that countries today can exist in isolation, or that they should exist in isolation. Our technological abilities allow us to share resources on a global level; oil is a perfect example of a commodity that is used globally but possessed unequally by its users. Some countries have oil, others don’t. Some countries have great agricultural capabilities, others don’t. Some countries have great technological capabilities, others don’t. In some of these cases of possession of a natural resource, it is where it is and there isn’t much you can do about it, while in cases of an artificial resource (e.g., brains, which are outsourced from India for US industry customer support) it is more situational. Labor works similarly. A poor heavily populated area can be seen as a resource for unskilled labor, an unpopulated area of any economic class would be seen as not much of a labor resource. And so on. While politically one could categorize nations at various levels of have and have not, it might make more sense to categorize them as having some stuff and not having some other stuff. What they have and don’t have, combined with their culture, defines them as members of the community of nations, and marks what is different between India and France and Ecuador, et alia.

As I say, our technological abilities allow us to share resources on a global level, so it stands to reason that, if we are so inclined, we can provide the resources that are missing from a country to that country, and presumably that country can provide the resources it has a surplus of to yet some other country that needs that resource. In other words, one can envision a utopia where all countries trade what they’ve got for what they haven’t got, and presumably everybody’s got something, so it will all work out. But utopia is the operative word here. Some countries really don’t have anything, and others really do have everything. The US, for instance, has just about everything except really cheap labor. We even have a lot of our own oil, although not enough for our actual usage (putting aside the necessity of that usage). Countries like Malawi or Somalia don’t have much of anything, and don’t really offer any particularly attractive resource for other nations on a reciprocal trade level. These countries would have to be transformed at their cores before they could become viable trade partners. So in reality, we have countries that don’t need all that much, countries that can probably trade well and equally, and countries that don’t have anything.

The countries in the middle, the ones that have something to trade, and do so, can be seen as sort of neutral on the geopolitical scene, if things are working out for them fairly well. France has wine, Germany has beer, they trade, everyone’s happy. This is not to say that life in these countries is ideal, but it’s pretty good. Modern-day Europe actually is a good example of this middle area, as the EU demonstrates. They’ve even developed a common currency, which has benefited some countries quite a bit, providing a backbone of economic security that transcends local fluctuations. The fringe European countries all want to be a part of the EU, for all the benefits it secures.

There are bigger issues at the top and the bottom. There is a question of whether the power (however you define it) of the US bestows on it extra responsibilities, which most people answer in the affirmative. There is the problem of how to bring the bottom countries around, making them viable players. And here is where this analysis, which has been primarily economic, begins to fall apart. If it were only just a question of moving piles of money around, with guaranteed results from the movement of those piles of money, everything would be fine. But what happens if you provide aid to a country, and that country’s oligarchy absconds with the loot? Or what if the political structure of the country is so unstable that even with the best of intentions the aid doesn’t make it to the people who need it. And aid in times of need is one thing, but what’s really needed is engines to permanently improve these nations, a combination of political and social determination hard to come by. And most of all, what about countries who are not looking at the world as mere finances, but have other goals, either territorial or cultural, regardless of their size or stability or economics?

That’s when things start to get complicated.

No comments: