The problem with the allegedly trick question, “True or false: One of the Beatles was left-handed” is that it does not stand to LD resolutional analysis. The theoretical trick is that the answer is False. Most people know that Paul McCartney was left-handed, but they don’t know that Ringo was also left-handed. The answer that the trickster is thinking is that not one but two of the Beatles were left-handed, hence the trick of the statement not being true, but the thing is, if two of the Beatles were left-handed, that means that one of the Beatles was left-handed and another one of the Beatles was left-handed, so in fact, the answer is True, because one of the Beatles was left-handed. True or false: one of the states in the US borders the Atlantic. This is true. The fact that more than one border the Atlantic does not remove any one of them from its bordering position.
Of course, this is idiotic noodling. Language is often a precision instrument, where we do our best to express our meanings with the exact words that do so. George Washington was a Virginian is a statement that precisely expresses the fact that a given person lived in a certain place. There is nothing arguable about those words (provided that the statement is true). George Washington was not a New Yorker, on the other hand, is not as precise a statement. Saying what something is, the first statement, eliminates the possibilities of what it isn’t. Saying that GW was a Virginian precludes that he might have been a French, a Turk or Proossian (or perhaps I-tal-i-an). He was a Virginian. He came from Virginia. But if the only statement we have to go by is that GW was not a New Yorker, then he could have indeed been a French, a Turk or Proossian (or perhaps I-tal-i-an, although despite all those temptations to belong to other nations—I’m sorry. You give me Gilbert and Sullivan and I have no alternative but to run with them.)
Anyhow, it’s easy to see the difference between inclusive and exclusive statements. One statement includes a fact, the other excludes a possibility. Inclusive is much more manageable than exclusive, at least in these cases.
I only point this out because it’s been going through my head as I put together Bean Trivia questions both for next week for the Sailors and for the Lex RR. It’s what I do, you know?
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There’s a different linguistic—and theoretical—problem with Jan-Feb. “Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.” What the affirmative needs to do is, of course, explain why sanctions ought not to be used. This is very clear. The only thing offered to the affirmative is that they support the non-use of ES. Anything else they do is beside the point. All the aff can do, I would imagine, at least if aff wants to win, is argue against ES. ES bad, ES ineffective, whatever (there are many potential tactics to support this strategy). It is, notably, no ES, at all times, no exception. If the neg can demonstrate any situation where ES ought to be used, theoretically that would win for the neg.
For the negative, on the other hand, the opposite position is not necessarily that ES ought to be used, although that is a perfectly good position if one wishes to run a strong argument. If the best defense is a good offense, a good offensive position for the neg might be that ES serve an important purpose in foreign policy. (It is, in fact, the status quo in the US, where we believe that the nations of the world uniting against Iran, using the tool of ES, can convince that country to abandon its nuclear position. This doesn’t make the position right, but it does demonstrate that it is part of the FP discourse.) But the language of the rez is such that the neg might claim that it need not run a clearly offensive position. The neg, rather than claiming that a position counter to “ought not be used” is “ought to be used,” a clear affirmation of using ES, can counter that the negation of the phrase is, instead, “ought not not be used.”
I ought not shoot my gun.
I ought shoot my gun. versus I ought not not shoot my gun.
There is a big difference between shooting my gun and not not shooting my gun. Shooting my gun sends a bullet out of the barrel. Not not shooting my gun discusses the possibility that I might shoot my gun without actually shooting it. Ought not not shoot means that I ought not claim not to shoot my gun.
That, in short, is the proposed theoretical substrata of a potential neg that wishes, rather than to take a strong position on its side of the resolution, to simply dangle the “possibility” of a strong position on its side of the resolution versus a forced strong position by aff on the other side. Frankly, this seems weak to me, or at least weaker than the straightforward do it versus don’t do it.
One can go further, of course. Aff can theorize (preemptively?) that being forced to disclaim all ES is somehow unfair when all neg has to do is claim potential ES, or for that matter, only the one ES necessary to negate. I might be convinced to buy the former position, but not the latter. If the argument is that something is categorically wrong versus its not being categorically wrong, that’s a fair debate. I’m not going to use them but I’m going to potentially use them, on the other hand, is just word games. In realpolitik, not supporting a claim is the equivalent of not making the claim. If everyone knows you’re not going to use your nukes, for instance, your nukes might as well not exist. You don’t rattle your saber unless you are willing to use it.
The good and the bad, in other words. Run a strong offense on both sides, or not. People will tell me that not running a strong offense, and running an evasive offense,
is better debating. I think I’d be hard-pressed to grant that, to tell you the truth.
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