Morality Part 2: Religion

The parable of the pup tells us a number of things, and raises a number of questions. The most important issue is the determination of right and wrong for the dog. The dog in the parable is a mechanical actor, following orders (or not following orders) blindly. The dog has no internal sense of right or wrong, although no doubt the dog does have an internal sense of pleasure and pain. If the dog were to act on its own, most likely it would act in favor of pleasure rather than in favor of pain. The point is that the dog is not a rational actor: the dog acts on instinct alone until its actions are modified by a master. And even obeying a master is, for a dog, instinctual, tied into its roots as a pack animal. Humans have been able to domesticate dogs because domestication is congruent with canine instincts. Humans have not been able to domesticate rattlesnakes because domestication is not congruent with pit viper instincts.

Because a dog is not a rational actor, we do not consider it a moral actor. Since it cannot make a moral determination for itself, its actions are amoral, even though from the perspective of the master certain of those actions are “good” and certain of them are “bad.” Realistically the master knows that these are trained behaviors, guided by the master’s desires, rather than conscious choices on the part of the dog. Because of the dog’s pack animal instincts, it presumably does not even choose to follow or not follow its master’s training: it’s instinct is to perform as a member of the pack, following the rules set down by the leader. When it does what the master wants, it is only following its own instincts.

AN ADDITIONAL FACT ABOUT HUMAN BEINGS

As we have said, human beings are, among other things, creatures of action. We do things. We perform actions.

Among those other things, we are creatures of thought. We are rational beings. We can think about our actions. We can choose to perform, or not to perform, those human actions that are voluntary (as compared to, say, having blood pumped by our heart, which is involuntary as long as we don’t terminate our own existence, which is certainly possible, but merely a footnote to the discussion). This ability to think is referred to as rationality, and the possession of this ability, combined with our nature as creatures of action, means that we are rational actors. Human beings are both creatures of action and creatures of reason.

As creatures of reason, we are able to think about our actions.

Let us return to the parable of the pup for a moment. One of the questions that remained unanswered was why the master selected some actions as right and some actions as wrong. Without answering that question, let’s look to a comparable situation of the master and the dog in the human model.

THE NUMBER ONE SOURCE OF HUMAN MORALITY

At the moment, we are doing our best to analyze morality from a neutral, objective position. From this position, a little research in the field will bring back to us the realization that the question of what is right and what is wrong is often approached by humans not as a question of rational consideration of various actions but as a subject of spirituality. Human beings, in addition to being rational creatures of action, are often, perhaps always, creatures of faith. By faith we mean the ability to hold as true ideas and concepts that we cannot define rationally; this is not necessarily religious faith, although religion, often by its own admission, does fall into this category. The religious person does not need to “prove” the existence of God; the religious person accepts the existence of God on faith. No proof is needed, or else something other than traditional proofs are accepted as warrant enough for belief. And even the non-religious person holds beliefs in things for which proofs are impossible or at the very least difficult and elusive.

Religion is a complicated subject and the point of this essay is not to question religious beliefs which, by their very nature, are beyond questionability. Nevertheless, religion is important to the moral philosopher because so many people derive their moralities from their religion. Many religions, including those of the Judeo-Christian tradition, have moral laws given by divine revelation. These are literally the laws of God. God has said that certain actions are good, and certain actions are bad. The authority for this version of morality is ultimate. The rightness or wrongness of human actions is made clear, or at least clear enough for the scholars of the religion to establish individual analysis of smaller acts (e.g., self-defense) in the light of broader strictures (“Thou shalt not kill”). The point is, many of us—perhaps most of us—derive our sense of right and wrong, our morality, from our religion.

Which takes us back to the parable of the pup. As we said, one of the questions that remained unanswered was why the master selected some actions as right and some actions as wrong. If you’re willing to accept that the model of God and human is comparable to master and dog, then the question can also be posed regarding God. Why has God selected some actions as right and others as wrong? This leads to a classical conundrum: is an action right or wrong because God says it’s right or wrong, or are actions inherently right or wrong and God is simply pointing out to us which ones are which? This is probably not answerable, whereas the master and dog metaphor does seem resolvable: the master determines, for whatever reasons, what is right and wrong for the dog, and while many, many masters might agree, there is no reason why they all would. Some people might raise their dogs with radically different rules from other people. It’s up to the master. The dog will follow the rules, whatever they are. Humans, on the other hand, even believing that a rule is God’s rule, can choose whether or not to obey it. Part of our inherent rationality, our minds, is the ability to use them. This ability to act on our thoughts is our will. In the religious context, this is often referred to as free will.

Human beings are rational creatures of action, which implies the possession of free will to make choices about which actions to perform. Many of us have faith in a religion that provides us with a moral framework for making those choices. But the faith does not answer the unanswerable question: Is an action right or wrong because God says it’s right or wrong, or are actions inherently right or wrong and God is simply pointing out the difference to us? Whichever way religion answers this unanswerable question, the question of what is right and what is wrong can become a subject of analysis outside of a religious context. If an action’s morality is inherent, then we can attempt to figure out why. And if an action’s morality has been determined by God, then we can attempt to figure out why. A rationalist approach need not conflict with religious belief.

Which brings us back to our moral philosophy square one, that we are rational creatures of action. We are able to analyze our actions and we have demonstrated that even a belief in a religious morality to determine what our actions ought to be does not obviate the use of our reason to do that analysis. I think it is important for the moral philosopher to understand the importance of religion and address it as we have here before addressing pure rationalism. But I think we are now on safe ground going forward, and we are almost ready take that purely rational view of the subject. As soon as we address one other important reality.